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We provide new empirical evidence suggesting that the marginal investor in mutual funds behaves
differently across market conditions. If the marginal investor allocates capital across mutual funds
rationally, then the relative performance of funds should be unpredictable. We find however that relative
fund performance is predictable after periods of high market returns but not after periods of low market
returns. The asymmetric predictability in performance we document cannot be explained by time-varying
differences in transaction costs or style exposures between funds, or by sample selection. Consistent
with the hypothesis that the asymmetric predictability in performance may be driven by unsophisticated
investors' mistakes when allocating capital, we document that performance predictability is more pronounced
for funds that cater to retail investors than for funds that cater to institutional investors.
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Traditional asset pricing models typically assume that marginal investors always behave ra-
tionally. But a number of studies document substantial deviations from rationality in the
behavior of some investors across di®erent market conditions. For example, Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001), Lamont and Thaler (2003), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), and Cooper,
Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) ¯nd indirect evidence that \unsophisticated" investors are
more likely to enter the stock market when market returns are high. Seru, Shumway, and
Sto®man (2009) document that unsophisticated investors learn more and make fewer mis-
takes in periods of low market returns. But what about the marginal investors? Do they
always behave rationally or do they behave less rationally in speci¯c market conditions?
We provide evidence of deviations of marginal investors' decisions from a rational bench-
mark model. We focus on the U.S. mutual fund industry to study investors' behavior because
the fund industry is large and economically important. By the end of 2007, 44 percent of
U.S. households owned mutual fund shares and invested a total of 12 trillion dollars in U.S.
mutual funds. During the same year, a record-high 883 billion dollars °owed into U.S. mutual
funds.1
To identify deviations from rational behavior by marginal investors, we use the Berk and
Green (2004) model of the mutual fund industry as a benchmark for a rational equilibrium
in the mutual fund industry. The model shows that if asset management has decreasing
returns to scale, as empirically suggested by Chen et al. (2004) and Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec
(2007), and if fund investors are rational, then fund °ows should adjust and equalize expected
performance across funds, thus resulting in no predictability of relative fund performance.
Consequently, the empirical relationship between fund °ows, past abnormal returns, and
future abnormal returns across funds should be informative about the rationality of the
marginal fund investor's decisions.
1See, the 2008 Investment Company Factbook (http://www.icifactbook.org.)
1We study the marginal investors' rationality using a large sample of mutual funds from
the 1980{2005 period. We establish that mutual fund °ows are sensitive to funds' past
performance, consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1997), among others. Similar to Carhart
(1997), we sort funds into performance quintiles and track their subsequent performance.
After periods of high market returns, the subsequent ranking of portfolios is preserved for at
least twelve months and the spread in four-factor alphas between high- and low-performance
portfolios is about 1:7% on an annualized basis. After periods of low market returns, the
performance ranking changes and the spread in four-factor alphas between high- and low-
performance portfolios is about zero. Relative performance is persistent after periods of high
market returns but not after periods of low market returns.
We observe a qualitatively similar pattern when we sort funds based on past fund °ows.
Building on existing empirical evidence (e.g., Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999)) suggesting
that funds with high past °ows perform better than funds with low past °ows in a given
month, we separate funds that receive °ows above the median from funds that receive °ows
below the median of the distribution of fund °ows in that month. The portfolio of high-°ow
funds would have earned 1:2% to 2:5% higher annualized abnormal return than the portfolio
of low-°ow funds after periods of high market returns. But both portfoliolos would have
earned practically the same return after periods of low market returns.
Our results are more pronounced when we look at holding-period horizons beyond one
month and they are robust to the inclusion of momentum and liquidity factors, time-varying
factor loadings, and variations in the de¯nitions of market conditions and fund-°ow cuto®s.
Our results suggest that after high market returns, investors could increase their expected
abnormal returns by moving their capital from funds with poor past performance and rela-
tively low °ows to funds with good past performance and relatively high °ows.
We explore a number of explanations for our ¯ndings. First, the marginal mutual fund
investor may be subject to asymmetric trading frictions in up and down markets, leading
her to rationally refrain from switching funds. Most trading frictions, such as load fees
2and lock-ins, appear to be either non-binding for at least one marginal investor or to be
constant across market conditions. Another friction is capital gains taxes|investors may be
reluctant to switch capital across funds, especially when realized returns are high, that is,
in good market conditions. Using fund turnover and momentum as proxies for the average
e®ective capital gains tax liability, we ¯nd only weak support for the hypothesis that taxes
explain our results.
Second, the patterns in performance predictability we ¯nd could be an artifact of a
particular correlation structure between the returns on our switching strategy and those on a
common passive strategy. For example, if high-°ow funds were value funds and low-°ow funds
were growth funds, switching between the two types of funds would be equivalent to investors
following a value strategy. To the extent that the pro¯tability of the value strategy was high
in up markets and zero in down markets, we would obtain observationally equivalent results
to ours. To test such an alternative, we calculate time-varying gains to predictability within
various commonly used investment styles. We ¯nd evidence of performance predictability
within each style category, which suggests that our ¯ndings are unlikely to result from
mechanically following a common, passive investment strategy.
Third, we ¯nd evidence that our ¯ndings do not result from time-varying di®erences in
a survivorship bias between funds in a high-°ow portfolio and those in a low-°ow portfolio.
Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that the observed asymmetry in performance pre-
dictability may be due to capital allocation mistakes by retail investors. We conjecture that
individual investors should be more subject to behavioral biases than institutional investors.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we ¯nd that the asymmetry in performance predictability
is concentrated among funds that cater to retail investors. We also ¯nd that performance
predictability is substantially stronger for young funds, consistent with the idea that young
funds cater to less sophisticated investors.
We argue that the observed changes in investors' rationality may a®ect fund managers'
behavior. After periods of high market returns, the marginal fund investor does not seem
3to process information e±ciently, and thus the incentives to exert costly e®ort and acquire
information about investment opportunities should be weaker for fund managers. To test
the hypothesis, we look at how cross-sectionally distinct the fund managers' investment
strategies are across market conditions. Based on activeness measures similar to those in
Chevalier and Ellison (1999), fund managers are more active after periods of low market
returns than after periods of high market returns. If the fund managers' activeness is costly,
then the fund managers' increased activeness after periods of low market returns may be a
rational response to an increase in the fund °ows' sophistication after periods of low market
returns.
Our results are related to several strands of literature. First, they contribute to the
growing empirical work on individuals' trading behavior. For example, Odean (1999) and
Barber and Odean (2001) conclude that investors with discount brokerage accounts trade
excessively as their realized returns tend to decrease with trading. Poteshman and Serbin
(2003) ¯nd evidence of irrational, early exercise in exchange-traded stock options by cus-
tomers of discount brokers or full-service brokers. We ¯nd evidence that casts doubt on the
rationality of retail mutual fund investors, particularly after periods of high market returns.
Second, our work is also related to a number of studies that document the in°uence of
unsophisticated investors on equilibrium asset pricing. Using the trade data from Chicago
Board of Trade, Coval and Shumway (2005) ¯nd that behavioral biases can have consequences
for the trading and pricing of futures contracts, and Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2006) ¯nd that
stocks heavily bought by individual investors in one week earn high returns in the subsequent
week, while stocks heavily sold in one week earn low returns in the subsequent week. Our
results show that rationality may need to be evaluated in a framework that accounts for
market conditions.
Third, we contribute to the literature on smart money in mutual funds. Gruber (1996)
and Zheng (1999) argue that fund °ows tend to predict future fund performance, the e®ect
called the smart-money e®ect. Subsequently, Wermers (2003) and Sapp and Tiwari (2004)
4cast doubt on the ¯nding by showing that smart money is largely a momentum-driven
phenomenon. Using the stock-level data based on mutual fund holdings, Frazzini and Lamont
(2008) document that the smart-money e®ect is very short lasting and if anything money is
actually dumb. Our view of the smart money e®ect is signi¯cantly di®erent. We evaluate
smart money through the lens of a rational equilibrium model and provide evidence that
points to the importance of market conditions for evaluating the rationality of fund °ows.
Finally, our empirical results also add to the discussion on the value of active management.
Carhart (1997) documents that active mutual funds do not outperform passive benchmarks.
He also shows that fund performance is hard to predict { a ¯nding challenged by other studies
which argue that traditional measures of performance may be too noisy as predictive variables
(e.g., Cohen, Coval, and P¶ astor (2005), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), and Kacperczyk, Sialm,
and Zheng (2008)). We show that even the standard measures of performance may have
predictive power if we restrict the analysis to certain states of the economy. We provide an
economic rationale for the ¯nding.
2 Theoretical Framework and Predictions
Our null hypothesis is that marginal investors' decisions are always rational. We use the
rational model of mutual fund investment in Berk and Green (2004) to provide a benchmark
for our empirical work (see also Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther (2000)). Berk and Green
(2004) study an economy with a competitive supply of capital by investors, di®erential ability
levels across fund managers, and learning about managers' ability to generate high returns
based on past returns.
Let RG
i;t+1 be fund i's return gross of expenses and fees between time t and t + 1, and
let qi;t be fund i's size at time t. The fund manager i charges a fee of fi;t per dollar to
manage the fund. Consistent with empirical ¯ndings by Chen et al. (2004) and Edelen,
Evans, and Kadlec (2007), generating positive abnormal returns becomes more di±cult as
5the size of the assets under management increases. Assuming that fund managers have no
capital, fund investors are the ones paying the fee and the cost from diseconomies of scale,









qi;t as the average cost of actively managing the fund between time t and
t+1. As in Berk and Green (2004), the cost function C is assumed to be strictly increasing
and strictly convex, implying that the average cost is increasing in fund size, consistent with
¯ndings of diseconomies of scale in asset management by Chen et al. (2004) and Edelen,
Evans, and Kadlec (2007).
For each fund i, there is a passive benchmark portfolio with a return of:
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where RF;t is the risk-free rate known at time t for the period between t and t + 1, Fk;t+1
is the excess return on the kth factor-mimicking portfolio, and ¯i;k for k = 1;:::;K are the
factor loadings of the fund's returns against the factor-mimicking portfolios. The net return
in excess of the benchmark return is:
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i;t+1: (3)
Under a competitive supply of capital by investors to mutual funds, the fund size and its
fee should adjust so that investors are indi®erent between investing in the mutual fund and
the benchmark portfolio. Therefore:
Et [®i;t+1 + ²i;t+1] = 0; (4)
6where Et denotes investors' expectation, conditional on all information available to the in-
vestors at time t.
Using equation (3), the competitive supply condition implies that the expected gross













Berk and Green (2004) consider an environment in which investors learn about the fund
manager's ability from the returns generated in the past. When investors observe a fund
returns, they update their beliefs about the manager's ability to produce excess returns in
the future. Given the competitive supply condition in equation (5), the fund's cost or fee
must adjust as investors update their beliefs. Empirically, fund fees tend to exhibit very
little time-series variation (see, e.g., Christo®ersen (2001)). If the fund manager does not
increase the fee, then fund size will increase causing an increase in the average cost until
equation (5) is satis¯ed. Berk and Green (2004) argue that such a mechanism can help
explain why investors appear to chase fund performance, despite the fact that abnormal
performance does not persist.
The main implication of the Berk and Green (2004) model for us is that future relative
performance should not be predictable using information available to investors. Fund size ad-
justs to make expected abnormal returns equal across all funds. Fund °ows re°ect investors'
decisions, and therefore provide a useful empirical instrument: If the reaction of fund °ows to
performance changes with market conditions, then accounting for market conditions should
provide power to our empirical tests on the predictability of mutual fund performance.
The no-predictability result is not speci¯c to Berk and Green (2004). A classic market
e±ciency argument suggests that predictability in abnormal returns, whether it is in the
context of mutual funds, equity shares or bonds, should disappear before ¯nancial markets
can reach an equilibrium. Berk and Green (2004) provide us with the mechanisms that
7describe how such an equilibrium should be reached in the open-end mutual fund industry.
The absence of predictability in abnormal performance in equilibrium holds, however, in
virtually any environment where the marginal investor behaves rationally.
In our empirical tests, we aim to identify situations in which the supply of investors'
capital to mutual funds is such that condition (5) does not hold. For example, we could think
of a situation in which a large number of investors participating in the mutual fund sector
do not behave in a fully rational manner. Suppose that such investors were not responsive
enough to information about past performance, relative to a fully rational setting. Then,
fund size would not be sensitive enough to past performance and, consequently, mutual funds
with good performance in one period would stay too small, their costs would be too small,
and these funds would o®er a positive expected abnormal return:
Et [®i;t+1 + ²i;t+1] > 0: (6)
Similarly, funds with poor performance in one period would stay too big, their costs
would be too large, and these funds would o®er a negative expected abnormal return:
Et [®i;t+1 + ²i;t+1] < 0: (7)
In such a situation, abnormal returns would tend to persist over time, unlike the prediction
of the Berk and Green (2004) model.
If fund performance depends on the fund manager's e®ort as well as ability, then any
information that is useful at predicting e®ort, will also provide predictive power for abnormal
returns. We use this insight to guide our choice of instruments. We also show that market
conditions are useful at predicting measures of fund manager's activeness.
83 Data
We de¯ne three market conditions: Up, Mid, and Down. An up market is when the three-
month moving average of the market excess returns for this time period is higher than its
historical 75th percentile. A mid market is when the three-month moving average of the
market excess returns for this time period is higher than its historical 25th percentile and
lower than its historical 75th percentile. A down market is when the three-month moving
average of the market excess returns for this time period is lower than its historical 25th
percentile. Historical percentiles for time period t are based on the three-month moving
average of S&P 500 index returns from quarter three of 1926 up to period t. We denote
the associated indicator functions with I(MKTt = Up), I(MKTt = Mid), and I(MKTt =
Down). Our results are robust to the use of alternative de¯nitions of market conditions such
as di®erent percentile cuto®s or longer-term averages of market returns.
We use monthly data over the period 1980 to 2005. The sample spans 309 months, out
of which 39 months are de¯ned as up markets and 38 months are de¯ned as down markets.
The remaining 232 months are mid-market observations. Market conditions tend to cluster
over time, as illustrated by the transition probabilities in Table 1. Figure 1 presents the
evolution of market conditions over time along with market returns. The shaded areas in
each panel indicate when each particular market condition is attained. Table 2 provides
summary statistics of key variables for the di®erent market conditions. The average market
return is 4.8% in up markets and {3.0% in down markets.
To construct our sample of funds, we merge the CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual
Fund Database with the Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum holdings database and the
CRSP stock price data using the methodology of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008). The
CRSP mutual fund database includes information on fund returns, total net assets, di®erent
types of fees, investment objectives, and other fund characteristics. The CDA/Spectrum
database provides stock holdings of mutual funds. These data are collected both from reports
9¯led by mutual funds with the SEC and from voluntary reports generated by the funds. We
also link reported stock holdings to the CRSP stock database to obtain further information.
We focus our analysis on domestic open-end diversi¯ed equity mutual funds, for which
the holdings data are most complete and reliable. We therefore eliminate from our sample
balanced, bond, money market, international, sector, and index funds, as well as funds not
invested primarily in equity securities. We also exclude funds that hold less than 10 stocks,
funds that invest less than 80% of their assets in equity, and funds that in the previous
month managed less than $5 million. We also aggregate funds with multiple share classes
into portfolios by value-weighing each share class. Appendix A provides further details on
the sample selection. Overall, our sample includes 3,477 distinct funds and 250,219 fund-
month observations. The number of funds in each month varies from 158 in May 1980 to
1,670 in July 2001.
We also use the additional variables de¯ned below. Flow is the fund °ow de¯ned as the
growth rate of the assets under management (TNA), after adjusting for the appreciation of
the mutual fund's assets (R), assuming that all cash °ows are invested at the end of the
period:
Flowi;t =
TNAi;t ¡ TNAi;t¡1 ¤ (1 + Ri;t)
TNAi;t¡1
: (8)
R is the monthly return net of expenses of fund i measured over the period t ¡ 1 to
t. To measure Performance, we use the factor loadings estimated from a 36-month rolling
regression of a fund's returns on market premium, size, value, and momentum factors and
we subtract the required return, given these loadings, from the fund's realized return. TNA
is the fund's total net assets in $ millions. Expenses is the fund's expense ratio. Turnover
is the fund's turnover ratio. Load is the total load fee. Value is the average score of all
stocks in the fund's portfolio, where each stock is assigned a score from 1 to 5 based on its
book-to-market ratio. Size is the average score of all stocks in the fund's portfolio, where
10each stock is assigned a score from 1 to 5 based on its market capitalization. Momentum is
the average score of all stocks in the fund's portfolio, where each stock is assigned a score
from 1 to 5 based on its past 12-month returns.
Beta Deviation is the absolute value of the di®erence between fund i's beta in month t
and the average beta in that month of all funds in the fund's objective class. Individual fund
beta is a market beta from a four-factor model calculated using 36 months of past returns.
Sector Deviation is the mean square root of the sum of squared di®erences between the share
of fund i's assets in each of 10 industry sectors of Fama and French (1997) and the mean share
in each sector in month t among all funds in the fund's objective class (aggressive growth,
growth, or value). Unsystematic Deviation is the absolute value of the di®erence between
fund i's unsystematic risk, Unsystematic Risk, and the sample average of this variable over
all funds in the fund's objective class in month t. Unsystematic Risk is the absolute value
of the residual from the four-factor model of Carhart (1997).
Table 2 reports summary statistics for these variables; Panel A for the entire sample,
Panel B for up markets only, and Panel C for up markets only. Most of the numbers in the
unconditional sample are consistent with those reported in previous studies, which gives us
con¯dence that our analysis is not biased due to sample selection.
Mutual funds in our sample tend to receive more °ows after high market returns but do
not necessarily perform better on a risk-adjusted basis. Most other variables do not vary
much across the two market conditions, except for measures of deviation, which tend to be
higher in down markets. We defer the speci¯c explanation of these results to later sections.
114 Predictability of Fund Flows and Returns
4.1 The Conditional Flow-Performance Relationship
The model of rational fund °ows in Berk and Green (2004) assumes that investors are
Bayesian and learn about managerial ability from a fund's past returns. The equilibrium
behavior by such investors is to adjust their capital °ows rationally based on past perfor-
mance. Such learning implies that fund °ows should be positively related to past fund
performance. Here, we evaluate how investors' reaction to fund performance changes with
market conditions.
We run a regression in which we relate Flow to Performance and study the interaction
of Performance with indicator functions for market conditions:2















t + FundF:E: + ²
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t+1; (9)
where I(MKTt = z) for z 2 fUp;Downg are the market state variables at time t; and Xi;t
de¯nes the set of control variables including Performance, Log(Age), Log(TNA), Expenses,
Turnover, Load, Value, Size, and Momentum. We consider speci¯cations with and without
fund ¯xed e®ects. All standard errors are clustered at both fund and time. The coe±cients
of interest are the loadings on the interaction terms, °z
2 for z 2 fUp;Downg.
The results, presented in Table 3, suggest a strong dependence between °ow sensitivity
to performance and market conditions. Flows are more sensitive to performance after up
markets than after down markets: A one-standard-deviation increase in performance will lead
to subsequent fund °ows that are higher by about 10 percent of their standard deviation
after up markets than down markets. This di®erence is also statistically signi¯cant based on
2To control for potential nonlinearity e®ects, we repeat the same analysis including squares of the fund-
performance term. The results, which we do not report here, are largely una®ected.
12the F-test in the lower panel of the table.
Although the behavior of fund °ows may be indicative of di®erences in learning, it is
not su±cient to judge if investors' decisions are rational. For example, even though the
behavior of °ows changes with market conditions (e.g., Warther (1995) and Edelen and
Warner (2001)), these variations may be rational if the optimal portfolio mix for investors
also depends on past market returns (e.g., Barberis (2000) and Xia (2001)). To judge the
rationality of actual fund °ows, we investigate the predictability of mutual fund performance
and compare it to the predictions from the rational model of Berk and Green (2004).
4.2 Performance Predictability
4.2.1 Main Results
The Berk and Green (2004) model predicts that rational investors move capital across funds
in an attempt to bene¯t from future abnormal returns o®ered by some funds. The resulting
capital °ows adjust the size of each fund such that, after considering for diseconomies of
scale, predicted performance going forward is the same for all funds. Fund °ows chase past
performance but do not help to predict future performance. Similarly, past performance
helps to predict fund °ows but does not help to predict future performance. We use these
predictions to assess how e±ciently the marginal investor allocates capital among funds in
di®erent market conditions.
We start by looking at performance persistence. Similar to Carhart (1997), we assign
funds into quintile portfolios based on their past four-factor performance. Observations
are then sorted based on the market condition during that month. Next, we calculate the
equally weighted cumulative performance for these fund quintiles over the subsequent three,
six, nine, and twelve months, depending on the market condition when these portfolios are
constructed.
13Figure 2 depicts the results. The top panel is for portfolios constructed in an up market
and the bottom panel is for portfolios constructed in a down market. Persistence patterns
di®er signi¯cantly depending on whether the portfolios were constructed after an up or a
down market. After an up market, subsequent alphas are monotonically increasing in past
alphas. For example, in the sorting period (t = 0), the spread in performance between
the top and bottom-quintile funds is around 5:5%. While the spread subsequently narrows,
it remains positive and economically signi¯cant, ranging from 1:0% after three months to
1:7% after twelve months. In contrast, after a down market, the sorting is not preserved.
While the top-quintile funds outperform the bottom-quintile funds by 7:2% in the sorting
period, subsequent alphas do not seem to be related to past alphas. Graphically, the lines in
the upper panel do not intersect, while those in the bottom panel exhibit multiple crossing
points.3 The ¯ndings suggest that past performance can be used to predict future fund
performance after periods of high market returns but not after periods of low market returns.
We next examine whether fund °ows can be used to predict future performance and
how such predictability depends on market conditions. We construct two equally weighted
portfolios { the \High" portfolio includes funds with °ows that are higher than the median
°ow in the past month and the \Low" portfolio includes funds with °ows that are lower than
the median °ow.4 These portfolios are held for one, three, six, and twelve months.
We begin by estimating an unconditional regression model of the two portfolios' returns
on the four factors used by Carhart (1997):
Rj;t+1 = ®j +
K X
k=1
¯k;jFk;t+1 + ²j;t+1: (10)
3For robustness, we repeat the same analysis with quarterly frequency or based on decile portfolios; the
qualitative ¯ndings remain unchanged.
4This approach deviates slightly from that in Zheng (1999) and Sapp and Tiwari (2004) who sort funds
based on positive and negative °ows. While the approach these papers take is not as critical in the context
of the unconditional framework, it is less desirable in our context given that the distribution of °ows may
vary systematically across market conditions. Nevertheless, the qualitative aspects of our results remain
unchanged if we follow the alternative approach instead.
14for j 2 f+;¡g, where R+;t+1 is the excess return on the portfolio of funds with above-median
°ows and R¡;t+1 is the excess return on the portfolio of funds with below-median °ows, Fk;t+1
is the return on factor k, and ¯k;j is the loading on factor k. Subsequently, we augment the
unconditional speci¯cation with two indicator functions for lagged up and down markets.
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Table 4 presents the results. The table is divided into four sections, each corresponding
to a di®erent investment horizon. The ¯rst two columns of each section report results
from unconditional regressions whereas the next two columns report results from conditional
regressions. The bottom panel of the table reports two sets of results. The ¯rst two columns
in each section show whether the conditional alpha is di®erent from zero separately for up
and down markets. The third column in each section shows whether the di®erence in alphas
{ unconditional and conditional { between these two portfolios is statistically di®erent from
zero.
Unconditionally, both groups of funds generate average alphas that are not statistically
di®erent from zero or from each other. The di®erence is statistically signi¯cant at con-
ventional levels only for the six-month horizon. The economic magnitude of most of the
di®erences is small. These ¯ndings are consistent with the absence of mutual fund per-
formance persistence documented by Carhart (1997) and Sapp and Tiwari (2004), among
others.
Turning to the conditional regressions, we ¯nd that the high-°ow portfolio has an alpha
that is indistinguishable from zero after down markets. However, the low-°ow portfolio
generally has negative alphas that are worse after down markets. As the bottom panel of
Table 4 shows, the performance of the high-°ow portfolio is signi¯cantly better than that
of the low-°ow portfolio only after up markets. Performance predictability is economically
15signi¯cant and ranges from 1:1% on an annualized basis over a three-month horizon to 1:7%
on an annualized basis over a six-month horizon.
A strategy that buys funds with high past °ows after periods of high market returns
has a signi¯cantly better performance than a strategy that buys funds with low °ows after
periods of high market returns. A strategy that buys funds with high past °ows after
periods of low market returns does not, however, have a signi¯cantly better performance
than a strategy that buys funds with low °ows after periods of low market returns. The
asymmetry is consistent with fund investors incorporating information more e±ciently after
periods of low market returns than after periods of high market returns. After periods of low
market returns, the marginal investor in a low-°ow fund would not bene¯t from switching
to a high-°ow fund but would bene¯t from switching after periods of high market returns,
thereby earning a signi¯cantly higher risk-adjusted return.
Table 4 shows a di®erence in the factor loadings between the two portfolios. While all
funds have positive and statistically signi¯cant loadings on the market and the size factors,
funds with high past °ows have a greater loading on the momentum factor than do funds
with low past °ows. Fund with low past °ows generally have an insigni¯cant loading on
momentum for a horizon up to three months and positive loadings at horizons between six
months and a year. Likewise, the portfolio of funds with high °ows has a negative loading
on the value factor. In turn, the sign of the loading is positive for the portfolio of funds with
low °ows.
To allow for the possibility that factor loadings may vary over time, we regress the high-
and low-°ow portfolio returns on the four factors interacted with the indicator functions
of market conditions. The speci¯cation aims to study whether the pattern in performance
predictability is robust to changes in factor loadings. The top part of Table 5 presents the re-
gression results and the bottom part reports the di®erences in unconditional and conditional
performance between the two portfolios.
16Our main results remain unchanged. Unconditionally, there is no abnormal return from
switching between low- and high-°ow funds. Moreover, the high-°ow portfolio generates a
substantially higher alpha than the low-°ow portfolio after up markets, at horizons of three
to twelve months while both portfolios generate statistically indistinguishable performance
from each other after down markets. Unsurprisingly, the magnitude of the spread decreases
monotonically for longer investment horizons. Speci¯cally, the return ranges from 1:3% for
a one-year investment horizon to 2:5% on an annualized basis for a three-month horizon.
4.2.2 Robustness Tests
Although the reported results are suggestive of the important di®erences in performance
predictability across market conditions, they may also be sensitive to the empirical design
we utilize. Thus, we assess the sensitivity of these results. We summarize the key ¯ndings in
Table 6. In Panel A, we examine performance predictability from switching between funds
whose °ows are higher than the 75th percentile of the °ow distribution in the past month
and funds whose °ows are lower than the 25th percentile of the distribution. We still ¯nd
performance predictability after up markets and no performance predictability after down
markets. Moreover, the magnitude of the abnormal return increases and varies between 2%
for a one-year investment horizon and 3:9% on an annualized basis for a three-month horizon,
consistent with the idea that sorting on more extreme fund °ows would generate stronger
performance predictability.
In Panel B, rather than using past one-month fund °ows as a sorting variable, we use the
average °ows over the past three months and the median °ow as a cut-o® value. The results,
though economically less signi¯cant, are qualitatively similar. We ¯nd statistically signi¯cant
predictability after up markets but not after down markets. The results are similar if we
use a six-month average °ow instead. In Panel C, we condition the strategy on past-month
percentage °ows rather than the dollar °ows. Again, the results are similar qualitatively and
the magnitudes are slightly larger than before.
17Finally, in Panel D, we calculate abnormal returns using the three-factor model of Fama
and French, that is, we exclude the momentum factor from Carhart's regression. The quali-
tative and the quantitative aspects of our results are similar for strategies after up markets.
On the other hand, while we observe no statistically signi¯cant predictability after down
markets, the economic magnitudes of the spread portfolio become slightly larger. The result
is consistent with evidence by Sapp and Tiwari (2004) that momentum drives an important
part of the observed unconditional predictability in mutual fund returns.
Our results indicate a signi¯cant degree of predictability in the returns of a strategy in
which investors switch capital between high- and low-°ow funds after periods of high market
returns, and no predictability of such a strategy after periods of low market returns. While
we believe that past fund °ows are a natural choice for a predictive variable because they
summarize the information used by investors coming from various sources, we look also check
if predictability persists with other predictive variables.
Another signal that investors might consider is past returns, unadjusted for risk. In
particular, Lynch and Musto (2003) document that investors' fund °ows are highly sensitive
to past raw returns and thus it is legitimate to believe that investors could base their decisions
on such information. To this end, we use a three-month lagged fund return as a predictive
variable and sort funds into a group with positive returns and a group with negative returns.
We repeat the analysis presented in Table 5 using raw returns.
The results with the new predictive variable are qualitatively similar to those reported in
Table 5. There is a signi¯cant degree of performance predictability after periods of high mar-
ket returns but no performance predictability after periods of low market returns. Moreover,
as earlier, there is little performance predictability for the very short, one-month investment
horizon and strong performance predictability for the three-month, six-month, and twelve-
month investment horizons. The economic magnitude of the results is comparable to that of
strategies that condition on past fund °ows. All the portfolio returns are signi¯cant at the
1% level.
18Finally, the predictability results might rely on di®erences in equally weighted portfolios.
In this approach, we assign a greater weight to smaller funds than the market does. To the
extent that small funds systematically di®er from large funds, the di®erences in composition
of funds across di®erent portfolios and times could produce biased results. To account
for that, we repeat the analysis using value-weighted fund portfolios. The economic and
statistical magnitudes of the results remain unchanged. Thus, the predictability results are
unlikely to be driven by di®erences between small and large funds.
In summary, we ¯nd evidence suggesting that key pieces of information { raw returns,
risk-adjusted returns, and fund °ows { are processed di®erently by the marginal investor
after periods of high market returns and periods of low market returns. Using the Berk
and Green (2004) model to derive implications for the cross section of fund performance in
the presence of fully rational fund °ows, our ¯ndings suggest that capital is allocated more
e±ciently after periods of low market returns than after periods of high market returns.
Further, the model's predictions allow us to interpret the ine±ciency. It has been suggested
elsewhere that boundedly rational investors may overreact to information but, we ¯nd that
mutual fund investors underreact to information after periods of high market returns. Funds
with low past performance and low °ows tend to remain too large after periods of high
market returns, which gives rise to subsequent abnormally low performance for up to a year.
5 Possible Explanations of Empirical Results
We now entertain several hypotheses that could potentially explain our ¯ndings. We ¯rst
consider rational explanations related to transaction costs or mechanical patterns in the
data. Subsequently, we evaluate our results from a behavioral perspective.
195.1 Transaction Costs
The asymmetric ine±ciencies we report might be the result of time-varying transaction costs.
In particular, transaction costs would have to o®set any abnormal gain unexplained by the
common factors, implying that transaction costs are signi¯cantly higher after up markets
than after down markets. Although direct trading costs or fund expenses do not di®er that
much over time, perhaps transaction costs due to di®erences in investors' taxation bases may
generate such time variation. For example, after up markets, investors who invest in high-
°ow funds may be more likely to have accrued higher taxable income than those investing
in low-°ow funds. As a result, the gap in their returns might simply be o®set by their tax
liability.
Although it is generally di±cult to measure directly tax impacts on each mutual fund
investor, tax liabilities are likely to be positively correlated with the degree of momentum
and turnover a fund exhibited in the past. To this end, we test the tax story in two ways:
conditional on funds' momentum loading and conditional on their turnover ratio. Opera-
tionally, we ¯rst sort funds according to their momentum loading: High-momentum funds
are de¯ned as those in which the Momentum indicator is greater than three; funds with Mo-
mentum below three are low-momentum funds. Subsequently, we evaluate the performance
predictability of those two portfolios after up and down markets.
Panels A and B of Table 7 report the results for momentum-sorted portfolios. The results
are qualitatively consistent with the previous ¯ndings for both low- and high-momentum
portfolios. We ¯nd statistically signi¯cant return predictability after up markets but not
after down markets. Although we ¯nd that the magnitude of the predictability is slightly
larger for the high-momentum portfolio, consistent with the tax explanation, the di®erences
between the two portfolios are generally small.
Similarly, Panels C and D of Table 7 report the results for portfolios of funds sorted
by turnover ratios (above and below the sample median). We ¯nd strong performance
20predictability in both low- and high-turnover portfolios after up markets and no performance
predicability after down markets. The economic magnitude is slightly larger for the high-
turnover portfolio, but once again the di®erence between the two portfolios is economically
negligible.
We conclude that our results are unlikely to be entirely driven by di®erences in transaction
costs induced by capital gains taxation.
5.2 Style-Based Predictability
Another possible explanation for our results is that the predictability patterns we observe
are an artifact of a particular correlation structure between the returns on our switching
strategy and those on a well-known passive strategy. For example, if high-°ow funds were
value funds and low-°ow funds were growth funds, switching between the two types of
funds would be equivalent to investors following a value strategy. To the extent that the
pro¯tability of the value strategy were high in up markets and zero in down markets, we
would obtain observationally equivalent results. Although our empirical approach controls
for any systematic di®erences in factor exposure, one could argue that the adjustment may
be imprecise. Hence, we examine the predictability results within di®erent investment styles.
Table 8 reports the results.
In Panels A and B, we split funds into broad classes of value and growth funds. Value
funds are de¯ned as those in which the Value indicator is greater than three; funds with
Value indicator below three are growth funds. We ¯nd qualitatively similar patterns within
both classes of funds. The magnitude of the observed predictability is slightly stronger for
value funds for shorter horizons and stronger for growth funds at longer horizons. In Panels
C and D, we compare smaller-cap and larger-cap funds. Smaller-cap funds are de¯ned as
those in which the Size indicator is below three; the funds with Size indicator above three
are larger-cap funds. We ¯nd no signi¯cant di®erence in economic magnitudes between the
21two categories of funds. However, the statistical signi¯cance is much stronger for larger-cap
funds. This di®erence is possibly due to the fact that our sample is tilted towards larger-cap
funds, which may help the precision of our estimates.
We conclude that our results are unlikely to be due to investors trading based on well-
known passive investment strategies.
5.3 Survivorship Bias
The design of our performance predictability tests relies on the fact that the mutual funds
included in each portfolio are present in the sample throughout the entire evaluation period
(up to twelve months). Our tests could be biased if some funds dropped out of the sample
before the end of the evaluation period. This would produce a survivorship bias (Brown et al.
(1992); Carpenter and Lynch (1999)). The survivorship bias issue would not be important
if the attrition process randomly a®ected both portfolios. In such a case, any performance
di®erence would be o®set by the di®erence in the long-short portfolio. On the other hand,
our results could result from the survivorship bias if for example funds in high-°ow portfolio
were subject to more attrition, and thus had better average performance, than funds in
low-°ow portfolio, especially after up markets.
We evaluate such a possibility by explicitly looking at the survival rates of di®erent
portfolios while also conditioning on market returns. In addition, we calculate survival rates
separately for each investment horizon. Table 9 reports the results. As expected, we ¯nd
that the survival rates decrease with an increase in investment horizon. Nevertheless, the
average survival rates are generally quite high: In the portfolio with a one-year investment
horizon these rates approach 90%. Moreover, we ¯nd no evidence of signi¯cant di®erences in
survivorship across the di®erent conditional portfolios. If anything, the di®erence in survival
rates is slightly higher for portfolios after down markets. Hence, we conclude that the
asymmetric predictability in performance we identify is unlikely to be driven by di®erences
22in funds' survivorship.
5.4 Investors' Capital Allocation Mistakes
In this section, we explore a behavioral explanation for our ¯ndings. We argue that the
mechanism behind our ¯ndings could be that the marginal investor simply makes more
mistakes when allocating capital after periods of high market returns than after periods of
low market returns. In particular, our results suggest that the marginal investor in mutual
funds appears to leave too much capital in poorly performing funds and not move enough
capital into well performing funds after periods of high market returns.
Our starting point for testing this hypothesis is that retail investors are more likely to
make capital allocation mistakes than are institutional investors. Speci¯cally, Lamont and
Thaler (2003) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) provide empirical evidence of irrational
investment decisions by individual or retail investors. Consequently, if capital allocation
mistakes are driving our ¯ndings of asymmetric predictability in mutual fund performance,
we expect the observed di®erences in °ow-performance sensitivity and in fund predictability
to be more pronounced for retail investors than for institutional investors.
To test these predictions formally, we divide funds into retail and institutional categories
using the ex-ante classi¯cation provided in the Mutual Fund CRSP Database and in the
case of missing observations using hand-collected data from fund prospectuses. We then
begin our analysis by estimating a multivariate regression model in which we test whether
the sensitivity of °ows to performance varies between two groups of funds. Speci¯cally, we
estimate the speci¯cation used in equation (9) separately for the two groups of funds.
Table 10 shows that retail fund °ows are much more sensitive to past performance after
up markets than after down markets. The di®erence between the two sensitivities, evaluated
using an F-test, is statistically signi¯cant at the 1% level. At the same time, we ¯nd that the
di®erence in sensitivities across market conditions is statistically insigni¯cant for institutional
23°ows. This result suggests that the time variation in °ows is driven by changes in the behavior
of unsophisticated fund investors rather than in the behavior of sophisticated ones.
We further test whether this di®erential responsiveness in °ows drives the observed di®er-
ences in performance predictability across market conditions. To do so, we estimate equation
(11) separately for retail and institutional investors. Panel A of Table 11 presents the results
for retail investors. We observe patterns similar to those presented in Table 5, i.e., strong
predictability in the performance earned by switching capital across funds after up markets
but no predictability in performance after down markets. The magnitude of the results is
economically signi¯cant and varies from 1:8% for a one-year horizon to 3:2% on an annu-
alized basis for a three-month horizon. In Panel B, we present the results for institutional
investors. We ¯nd no predictability in the performance earned from switching across funds
after up or down markets.
Another way in which we can evaluate the behavioral hypothesis is based on the argument
that young funds are generally regarded as new and fashionable and thus may attract °ows
from less sophisticated investors. Simultaneously, these funds are also less known to investors,
which makes it more likely for investors to make mistakes in their investments. To this end,
we consider two groups of funds: Funds that are not more than three years old, and funds
that are nine or more years old, which is the median fund age in our sample. For each group,
we again consider predictability patterns in the model in which investors can switch across
di®erent types of funds. Table 12 reports the results.
We ¯nd signi¯cant degree of performance predictability in both groups of funds after up
markets but not after down markets. However, the magnitude of the observed abnormal
returns is quite di®erent between the two groups. The results are very signi¯cant for young
funds, especially for short-term, one-month and three-month, horizons and are less signi¯cant
for longer horizons. In turn, the results for older funds are signi¯cant only for middle-term
horizons. These ¯ndings are consistent with the explanation that less sophisticated investors
channel their funds extensively and quickly to new mutual funds and are more subject to
24repeat the same capital allocation mistakes over time.
The results in this section suggest that the primary factor for the observed di®erences in
predictability across market conditions could be that the marginal dollar invested in funds
is less rational after up markets than it is after down markets. On the other hand, it is
less likely that the results can be explained by other rational stories based on di®erences in
transaction costs, style, or survivorship.
6 Predictability in Fund Managers' Strategies
In light of the evidence that mutual fund investors incorporate information e±ciently after
periods of low market returns but ine±ciently after periods of high market returns, we
investigate whether fund managers respond di®erentially to market conditions. Following
high market returns, when the marginal fund investor does not seem to allocate capital
across funds rationally, fund managers should have weaker incentives to exert costly e®ort to
acquire unique information. In contrast, their incentives should strengthen when the mutual
fund industry is more e±cient, that is, after periods of low market returns. Thus, the type
of information collected, processed, and used by mutual fund managers to form portfolios
should vary with market conditions.
One way in which such time variation in incentives may show up is that when more unique
information is known, funds should pursue investment strategies that are cross-sectionally
more distinct. Consequently, we examine how the level of cross-sectional dispersion in in-
vestment strategies moves with market conditions. We use measures similar to those of
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) to capture dispersion in managers' portfolios with respect to a
typical fund portfolio at time t.
We consider three dispersion measures. The ¯rst measure is Beta Deviation. It measures
boldness in the sense of taking a large bet on the direction of the market. The variable is
calculated as the absolute value of the di®erence between a fund i's beta in month t and the
25average beta in that month across all funds in the fund's objective class. Individual fund
beta is a market beta from a four-factor model calculated using 36 months of past returns:
BetaDeviationit =j Betait ¡ Betag;v j : (12)
The second measure is Sector Deviation, which measures boldness in the style of a manager.
The measure captures how much a manager concentrates her portfolio in sectors that di®er
from those that are most popular at the time. Speci¯cally, Sector Deviation is de¯ned as
the mean square root of the sum of squared di®erences between the share of fund i's assets
in each of 10 industry sectors of Fama and French (1997) and the mean share in each sector









(wkj ¡ wg;v)2); (13)
where wk is the weight of stock k in industry j, and wg;v is the weight of a fund objective
(growth, value) in the same industry j; J is the number of distinct industries.
The third dispersion measure is Unsystematic Deviation which measures fund boldness
in terms of a departure from a typical portfolio, based on the level of its unsystematic risk.
Speci¯cally, the variable is calculated as the absolute value of the di®erence between a fund's
unsystematic risk, Unsystematic Risk, and the sample average of this variable over all funds
in fund i's objective class in month t. Unsystematic Risk is the absolute value of the residual
from the four-factor model of Carhart (1997):
UnsystematicDeviationit =j UnsystematicRiskit ¡ UnsystematicRiskg;v j : (14)
By construction, a smaller value for each of these variables corresponds to less dispersion
5To identify investment objectives we use CDA style categories 2, 3, and 4. Industry sectors are de¯ned
using a modi¯ed 10-industry classi¯cation of Fama and French, as in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005).
26in the managers' portfolios and thus possibly less unique information being acquired.
We relate the measures of dispersion of investment strategies to market conditions by
estimating the regression model:
Dispersioni;t = ¸0 + ¸1I(MKTt = Up) + ¸2I(MKTt = Down) + ¸3Xi;t + FundF:E: + ²i;t:
(15)
Here, Dispersion denotes the degree of similarity in investment strategy of fund i at time t and
it is proxied by Beta Deviation, Sector Deviation, and Unsystematic Deviation. I(MKTt =
Up) and I(MKTt = Down) represent the state of the market, and X de¯nes the set of control
variables. Our controls include Performance, Log(Age), Log(TNA), Expenses, Turnover,
Flow, Value, Size, and Momentum. In addition, some speci¯cations include fund ¯xed
e®ects.
The coe±cients of interest are ¸1 and ¸2. We expect these coe±cients to vary system-
atically if the fund strategies di®er after up and down markets. For instance, if the fund
managers' strategies are similar after up but di®erent after down markets, ¸1 will be negative
and ¸2 will be positive.
The results, presented in Table 13, show that the managerial strategies are generally more
dispersed after down markets than after up markets. The di®erence between up markets and
down markets is statistically signi¯cant for measures of Beta Deviation and Unsystematic
Deviation and is statistically insigni¯cant for Sector Deviation. The results hold even when
we include fund ¯xed e®ects. Moreover, the coe±cient on I(MKTt = Up) is negative and the
coe±cient on I(MKTt = Down) is positive for two out of the three measures of dispersion.
Overall, our ¯ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that fund managers internalize the
behavior of fund investors in their trading strategies.
277 Conclusion
Using a rational equilibrium model of mutual funds as a benchmark, we document that the
marginal investor in the mutual fund sector does not appear to always behave rationally:
She appears to be more rational after periods of low market returns than after periods of
high market returns.
A number of ¯ndings lead to this conclusion. First, we observe a signi¯cant degree of
performance persistence after periods of high market returns and no persistence after periods
of low market returns. Second, we ¯nd a signi¯cant degree of cross-sectional predictability
in abnormal returns. In particular, investing in a strategy that takes a long position in funds
with high °ows would have earned an abnormal return that is economically and statistically
larger than a similar strategy using funds with low °ows after periods of high market returns
and approximately the same abnormal return after periods of low market returns. Likewise,
investing in a strategy that takes a long position in funds with high returns, either raw or
risk adjusted, would have earned an abnormal return that is economically and statistically
larger than that of a similar strategy using funds with low returns after periods of high
market returns and approximately the same abnormal return after periods of low market
returns. This predictability is mostly pronounced for investment horizons between three and
twelve months and is robust to the inclusion of standard risk and style controls, as well as
the time-series variation in factor loadings.
Using the argument that irrational behavior is more likely to come from retail investors
than institutional ones, we document that the di®erential response in fund °ows across mar-
ket conditions is largely con¯ned to °ows into retail funds rather than those into institutional
funds, suggesting that the observed di®erences in returns result from di®erences in the be-
havior of retail investors. Consistent with an equilibrium in which fund managers optimally
adjust their incentives to the e±ciency level of fund °ows, we ¯nd that fund managers' in-
vestment strategies are more dispersed cross-sectionally after periods of low market returns
28than after periods of high market returns.
Overall, our results imply that the equity mutual fund industry is less informationally
e±cient after high market returns, when the industry size increases, than after low market
returns. This ¯nding, in turn, has strong implications for the overall market e±ciency debate
and asset prices in general. Indeed, recent work by Vayanos and Woolley (2008) examines
implications of institutional trading for asset prices. Studying the implications of our ¯ndings
in such a setting appears to us like a fruitful area for future research.
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32Appendix A. Sample Selection
We base our selection criteria on the objective codes and on the disclosed asset compositions. First,
we select funds with the following ICDI objectives: AG, GI, LG, or IN. If a fund does not have any
of the above ICDI objectives, we select funds with the following Strategic Insight objectives: AGG,
GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, or SCG. If a fund has neither the Strategic Insight nor the ICDI objective,
then we go to the Wiesenberger Fund Type Code and pick funds with the following objectives: G,
G-I, AGG, GCI, GRI, GRO, LTG, MCG, and SCG. If none of these objectives are available and
the fund has the CS policy (Common Stocks are the mainly held securities by the fund), then the
fund will be included. We exclude funds that have the following Investment Objective Codes in the
Spectrum Database: International, Municipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred, and Balanced. Since
the reported objectives do not always indicate whether a fund portfolio is balanced or not, we also
exclude funds that, on average, hold less than 80% in stocks.
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) identify a form of survival bias in the CRSP mutual fund
database, which results from a strategy used by fund families to enhance their return histories.
Fund families might incubate several private funds and they will only make public the track record
of the surviving incubated funds, while the returns for those funds that are terminated are not
made public. To address this incubation bias, we exclude the observations where the year for the
observation is prior to the reported fund starting year and we exclude observations where the names
of the funds are missing in the CRSP database. Incubated funds also tend to be smaller, which
motivates us to exclude funds that had in the previous month less than $5 million in assets under
management.
In the next step, we are able to match about 94% of the CRSP funds to the Spectrum database.
The unmatched funds tend to be younger and smaller than the funds for which we ¯nd data in
Spectrum. Wermers (2000) mentions that the Spectrum data set often does not have any holdings
data available during the ¯rst few quarters listed in the CRSP database.
Mutual fund families introduced di®erent share classes in the 1990s. Since di®erent share classes
have the same holdings composition, we aggregate all the observations pertaining to di®erent share
classes into one observation. For the qualitative attributes of funds (e.g., name, objectives, year of
33origination), we retain the observation of the oldest fund. For the total net assets under management
(TNA), we sum the TNAs of the di®erent share classes. Finally, for the other quantitative attributes
of funds (e.g., returns, expenses, loads), we take the weighted average of the attributes of the
individual share classes, where the weights are the lagged TNAs of the individual share classes.
For most of our sample period, mutual funds are required to disclose their holdings semi-
annually. A large number of funds disclose their holdings quarterly, while a small number of funds
have gaps between holding disclosure dates of more than six months. To ¯ll these gaps, we impute
the holdings of missing quarters using the most recently available holdings, assuming that mutual
funds follow a buy-and-hold strategy. In our sample, 72% of the observations are from the most
recent quarter and less than 5% of the holdings are more than two quarters old. We exclude funds
that have fewer than 10 identi¯ed stock positions and funds that did not disclose their holdings
during the last year. This ¯nal selection criterion reduces the number of mutual funds used in this
study to 3,261 funds.
34Table 1: Market Conditions
This table presents means, standard deviations, and transition probabilities for di®erent market conditions.
I(MKTt = Up) equals one when the three-month moving average of market excess return is higher than the
75th percentile of the historical three-month moving average of market returns (starting Q3 of 1926); and
zero otherwise. I(MKTt = Mid) equals one when the three-month moving average of market excess return
is between the 25th and 75th percentiles of the historical three-month moving average of market returns
(starting Q3 of 1926); and zero otherwise. I(MKTt = Down) equals one when the three-month moving
average of market excess return is lower than the 25th percentile of the historical three-month moving average
of market returns (starting Q3 of 1926); and zero otherwise. The sample covers the period 1980-2005.
Conditions N MKT Return Conditional Probability
Mean S.D. I(MKTt+1 = Up) I(MKTt+1 = Mid) I(MKTt+1 = Down)
I(MKTt = Up) 39 0.048 0.030 0.526 0.474 0.000
I(MKTt = Mid) 232 0.012 0.035 0.084 0.836 0.080
I(MKTt = Down) 38 -0.030 0.065 0.000 0.526 0.474
35Table 2: Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are for all market conditions (Panel A), and conditional on either up- (Panel B) or down
market (Panel C). Flow is de¯ned as Flow =
TNAt¡TNAt¡1¤(1+Rt)
TNAt¡1 . R is the net return of the fund portfolio.
Performance is the alpha (including residual) from the four-factor model of excess fund returns projected
on market premium, size, value, and momentum factors. Age is the fund age. TNA is the total net assets
of a fund (in Millions). Expenses is the fund expense ratio. Turnover is fund turnover. Load is the total
fund load. Value is the average score of all stocks in the fund portfolio, where each stock is assigned a score
(from 1 to 5) based on its book-to-market ratio. Size is the average score of all stocks in the fund portfolio,
where each stock is assigned a score (from 1 to 5) based on its market capitalization. Momentum is the
average score of all stocks in the fund portfolio, where each stock is assigned a score (from 1 to 5) based on
its past 12-month returns. BetaDeviation is the absolute value of the di®erence between a fund's beta in
month t and the average beta in that quarter of all funds in the fund's objective class. Individual fund beta
is a market beta from a four-factor model calculated using 36 months of past returns. SectorDeviation is
the mean square root of the sum of squared di®erences between the share of a fund's assets in each of ten
industry sectors of Fama and French (1997) and the mean share in each sector in month t among all funds
in the fund's objective class (aggressive growth, growth, or value). UnsystematicDeviation is the absolute
value of the di®erence between a fund's unsystematic risk, UnsystematicRisk, and the sample average of this
variable over all funds in the fund's objective class in month t. UnsystematicRisk is the absolute value of the
residual from the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). I(MKTt = Up) equals one when the three-month
moving average of market excess return is higher than the 75th percentile of the historical three-month
moving average of market returns (starting Q3 of 1926); and zero otherwise. I(MKTt = Down) equals
one when the three-month moving average of market excess return is lower than the 25th percentile of the
historical three-month moving average of market returns (starting Q3 of 1926); and zero otherwise. The
data cover all equity mutual funds for the period 1980 to 2005.
Panel A: All Market Conditions
Mean S.D. Median p25 p75
Flow 0.0123 0.2381 -0.0003 -0.0147 0.0198
Return 0.0088 0.0549 0.0112 -0.0209 0.0406
Performance -0.0012 0.0225 -0.0012 -0.0112 0.0087
Age 13.9 14.2 9.0 5.0 17.0
TNA 920.6 3,636.5 153.8 44.9 543.5
Expenses 0.0129 0.0048 0.0123 0.0097 0.0154
Turnover 92.51 132.33 67.00 35.20 115.00
Load 0.0222 0.0261 0.0051 0.0000 0.0475
Value 2.6 0.5 2.6 2.2 2.9
Size 4.1 1.0 4.4 3.5 4.8
Momentum 3.3 0.6 3.3 2.9 3.7
Beta Deviation 0.1428 0.2767 0.1062 0.0505 0.1846
Sector Deviation 0.1875 0.0922 0.1703 0.1265 0.2280
Unsystematic Deviation 0.0084 0.0094 0.0066 0.0033 0.0106
Panel B: I(MKTt = Up)
Mean S.D. Median p25 p75
Flow 0.0147 0.3008 -0.0016 -0.0208 0.0208
Return 0.0474 0.0419 0.0435 0.0183 0.0674
Performance -0.0025 0.0224 -0.0023 -0.0137 0.0085
Age 14.5 14.5 9.0 5.0 18.0
TNA 884.8 3,457.0 150.8 44.9 529.0
Expenses 0.0126 0.0048 0.0120 0.0095 0.0150
Turnover 92.61 137.04 67.00 35.93 114.21
Load 0.0230 0.0280 0.0022 0.0000 0.0475
Value 2.6 0.5 2.6 2.2 3.0
Size 4.0 1.0 4.4 3.4 4.8
Momentum 3.3 0.6 3.2 2.9 3.7
Beta Deviation 0.1435 0.3822 0.1042 0.0503 0.1795
Sector Deviation 0.1916 0.0900 0.1758 0.1309 0.2334
Unsystematic Deviation 0.0086 0.0083 0.0070 0.0035 0.0109
Panel C: I(MKTt = Down)
Mean S.D. Median p25 p75
Flow 0.0073 0.3897 -0.0025 -0.0163 0.0158
Return -0.0289 0.0790 -0.0268 -0.0782 0.0200
Performance -0.0001 0.0296 -0.0002 -0.0139 0.0142
Age 13.4 13.8 8.0 5.0 16.0
TNA 978.1 3,720.3 155.9 43.3 558.9
Expenses 0.0129 0.0047 0.0124 0.0099 0.0155
Turnover 98.65 132.08 72.00 39.00 122.00
Load 0.0212 0.0254 0.0041 0.0000 0.0458
Value 2.5 0.5 2.5 2.2 2.9
Size 4.2 0.9 4.6 3.6 4.9
Momentum 3.3 0.7 3.3 2.8 3.8
Beta Deviation 0.1446 0.1518 0.1102 0.0522 0.1924
Sector Deviation 0.1855 0.0913 0.1686 0.1230 0.2279
Unsystematic Deviation 0.0105 0.0106 0.0083 0.0042 0.0134
36Table 3: Flow-Performance Relationship Conditional on Market Returns
The dependent variable is fund °ow (Flow). Bottom row provides the F-test along with its p-values of the
di®erences between coe±cients on I(MKTt = Up) and I(MKTt = Down). Our controls include Perfor-
mance, Log(Age), Log(TNA), Expenses, Flow, Turnover, Value, Size, and Momentum. Flow, Performance,
and Turnover have been winsorized at the 1% level. All variables are de¯ned in Table 2. I(MKTt = Up)
equals one when the three-month moving average of market excess return is higher than the 75th percentile
of the historical three-month moving average of market returns (starting Q3 of 1926); and zero otherwise.
I(MKTt = Down) equals one when the three-month moving average of market excess return is lower than
the 25th percentile of the historical three-month moving average of market returns (starting Q3 of 1926); and
zero otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by fund and time. A bottom panel reports an
F-test of di®erences in coe±cients on I(MKTt = Up) and I(MKTt = Down) along with their p-values (in




















I(MKTt = Up) 0.076 0.085
x Performance (0.091) (0.086)
I(MKTt = Down) -0.160 -0.132
x Performance (0.058) (0.056)
I(MKTt = Up) 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.004)
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43Table 10: Flow-Performance Relationship and Market Conditions: Based on In-
vestors' Type
We divide all funds into institutional and retail categories and estimate regression equations for each group
separately. The dependent variable is fund °ow (Flow). Bottom row provides the F-test along with its
p-values of the di®erences between coe±cients on I(MKTt = Up) and I(MKTt = Down). Our controls
include Performance, Log(Age), Log(TNA), Expenses, Flow, Turnover, Value, Size, and Momentum. Flow,
Performance, and Turnover have been winsorized at the 1% level. All variables are de¯ned in Table 2.
I(MKTt = Up) equals one when the three-month moving average of market excess return is higher than the
75th percentile of the historical three-month moving average of market returns (starting Q3 of 1926); and
zero otherwise. I(MKTt = Down) equals one when the three-month moving average of market excess return
is lower than the 25th percentile of the historical three-month moving average of market returns (starting
Q3 of 1926); and zero otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by fund and time. A bottom
panel reports an F-test of di®erences in coe±cients on I(MKTt = Up) and I(MKTt = Down) along with
their p-values (in parentheses). The data cover the period 1980 to 2005.
Flows
Institutional Retail
Performance 0.169 0.124 0.254 0.201
(0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024)
Log(Age) -0.006 -0.019 -0.007 -0.013
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Log(TNA) 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Expenses -0.074 0.344 -0.190 0.233
(0.158) (0.324) (0.168) (0.227)
Turnover -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Loads 0.060 -0.020 -0.002 -0.023
(0.027) (0.033) (0.019) (0.039)
Value 0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Size -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Momentum 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Performance x 0.021 0.020 0.100 0.112
I(MKTt = Up) (0.092) (0.088) (0.096) (0.092)
Performance x -0.070 -0.042 -0.187 -0.160
I(MKTt = Down) (0.067) (0.065) (0.059) (0.057)
I(MKTt = Up) 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
I(MKTt = Down) -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.028 0.023 -0.003 0.027
( 0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.012)
Observations 47,702 47,702 144,019 144,019
R2 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.10
Fund Fixed-E®ects No Yes No Yes
F-test: I(MKTt = Up) £ Perf: = I(MKTt = Down) £ Perf:
Di®erence 0.091 0.062 0.287 0.272




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Table 13: Fund Strategies and Market Conditions
The dependent variables are BetaDeviation in Columns (1) and (2), SectorDeviation in Columns (3) and
(4) and UnsystematicDeviation in Columns (5) and (6). Bottom row provides the F-test along with its
p-values of the di®erences between coe±cients on I(MKTt = Up) and I(MKTt = Down). Our controls
include Performance, Log(Age), Log(TNA), Expenses, Flow, Turnover, Value, Size, and Momentum. Flow,
Performance, and Turnover have been winsorized at the 1% level. All variables are de¯ned in Table 2.
I(MKTt = Up) equals one when the three-month moving average of market excess return is higher than the
75th percentile of the historical three-month moving average of market returns (starting Q3 of 1926); and
zero otherwise. I(MKTt = Down) equals one when the three-month moving average of market excess return
is lower than the 25th percentile of the historical three-month moving average of market returns (starting
Q3 of 1926); and zero otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by fund and time. A bottom
panel reports an F-test of di®erences in coe±cients on I(MKTt = Up) and I(MKTt = Down) along with
their p-values (in parentheses). The data cover the period 1980 to 2005.
Beta Sector Unsystematic
Deviation Deviation Deviation
Performance -0.196 -0.167 0.056 0.024 -0.139 -0.099
(0.054) (0.032) (0.052) (0.024) (0.192) (0.159)
Log(Age) 0.001 0.007 -0.022 -0.022 -0.011 -0.031
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007)
Log(TNA) -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Expenses 2.161 -0.428 1.739 -0.674 4.835 0.040
(0.513) (0.193) (0.326) (0.187) (0.851) (0.788)
Flow -0.015 0.001 0.011 -0.014 0.029 0.024
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.037) (0.029)
Turnover 0.015 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.048 0.028
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.004)
Value 0.004 0.003 0.011 0.002 -0.026 -0.025
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006)
Size -0.010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.007 -0.029 -0.036
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ( 0.001) (0.005) (0.007)
Momentum -0.002 -0.009 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006)
I(MKTt = Up) -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.007
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
I(MKTt = Down) 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Constant 0.146 0.199 0.219 0.281 0.787 0.897
(0.026) (0.010) (0.022) (0.007) (0.048) (0.042)
Observations 167,584 167,584 58,144 58,144 167,584 167,584
R2 0.03 0.39 0.07 0.64 0.02 0.10
Fund Fixed-E®ects No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-test: I(MKTt = Up) = I(MKTt = Down)
Di®erence -0.013 -0.012 -0.000 0.000 -0.016 -0.018
(0.000) (0.032) (0.821) (0.894) (0.001) (0.017)
48Figure 1: Market Return and Conditioning Variables
This ¯gure presents means the monthly market excess returns (solid black line) with the di®erent market
conditions. In the upper panel, months de¯ned as I(MKTt = Up) are shaded gray. These are the months
in which the three-month moving average excess returns is higher than the 75th percentile of the historical
three-month moving average of market excess returns. In the lower panel, months de¯ned I(MKTt = Down)
are shaded gray. These are the months in which the three-month moving average excess returns is lower
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49Figure 2: Performance Persistence vs. Market Conditions
This ¯gure depicts the three, six, nine, and twelve months performance of one-month alpha-sorted funds.
Alpha is computed using a standard four-factor model, regressed over a 36-month period. Funds are sorted
into ¯ve decile groups such that \Quintile 1" (\Quintile 5") refers to the best (worst) past alpha funds. The
average alpha during the one month sorting period is reported as \Month 0". The upper panel shows the
results for funds sorted following months in which I(MKTt = Up), which are de¯ned as months in which the
three-month moving average excess returns is higher than the 75th percentile of the historical three-month
moving average of market excess returns. The lower panel shows the results for funds sorted following months
in which I(MKTt = Down), which are de¯ned as months in which the three-month moving average excess
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